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Will Zuzak; DEMANUK.017 = 1989-07-06 Critique of Wagenaar book; 1995-04-04
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Identifying Ivan: A Case Study in Legal Psychology
Willem Wagenaar, Harvard University Press, 1988
A Critique by W. W. Zuzak, Ph.D., P.Eng.
C.P. 293, Ste. Julie, Quebec J0L 2C0

Dr. Wagenaar appeared in the John Demjanjuk Trial as a defense witness, testifying about problems of identification by eyewitnesses, but the Jerusalem court "declared that the testimony was irrelevant because the surviving witnesses could not make mistakes". He must be congratulated for having written and published his book so quickly after the conclusion of the trial in April 1988.

In addition to dissecting the eyewitness identification procedures of this specific trial with dazzling brilliance, he makes very important contributions to our theoretical understanding of the problems of eyewitness identification and the role of an expert witness in a trial.

Our critique consists of three sections: a brief outline of the various chapters, a detailed look at the Identification of John Demjanjuk (Chapter 4) and critical comments on specific quotations from the book. In referring to page numbers, we shall use the letters W to indicate Wagenaar's book and A, V and T to indicate the Appeal, Verdict and English-language Transcripts of John Demjanjuk's Jerusalem trial. Tav and nun refer to official trial documents submitted by the prosecution and defense.

A. Chapter Outline

Chapter 1: Dr. Wagenaar first gives a brief introduction to the crucial role of eyewitness identification in the Demjanjuk case, since Mr. Demjanjuk has steadfastly maintained that he was never in Treblinka as claimed by a small, select group of survivors who testified for the prosecution. He then cites two cases where people were falsely convicted on erroneous eyewitness identification: (1) Lazlo Virag in England, convicted in July 1969 and exonerated in 1974; (2) Frank Walus, accused of being the Butcher of Kielce, Poland, stripped of his American citizenship in 1978 based on the testimony of 11 Jewish eyewitnesses and exonerated when irrefutable evidence was presented that at that time he was a 17 year old Ostarbeiter doing forced labour on a farm in Bavaria.

He then discusses the case of Marinus de Rijke who served as an Oberkapo in the penal colony Camp Erika in the Netherlands in 1942-43 and was tried in a Dutch court in 1984. Comparison of the testimony of the same 15 eyewitnesses as given in the 1940s and 1980s showed remarkable discrepancies in detail as well as plain forgetfulness.

Chapter 2: A short review of some relevant literature shows that "identification of people by eyewitnesses is not always reliable, and that reliability depends upon a multitude of aspects". Of particular relevance to the Demjanjuk case are Wagenaar's discussions of specific bias in unfair lineups, repeated exposure of witnesses to photographs of the accused, and unconscious suggestion by the experimenter.

Chapter 3: Wagenaar presents 50 rules for the conduct and interpretation of identity tests, many of which are based on The Devlin Report of 1976 in Great Britain. It is quite likely that many of these rules (or refined variations thereof) shall eventually be accepted as standard identification procedure in most countries. In addition to the standard rules associated with fairness of the lineups, of particular relevance to the Demjanjuk case are Rule 11 "All identification attempts, whether successful or not, must be reported." and Rule 44 "Defense counsel should be given the right to attend identification tests." (In the State of Israel the presence of defense counsel is required by law.)

Chapter 5: Here Wagenaar lists the multitude of violations of these rules in the procedures used for the identification of John Demjanjuk, which he has outlined in some detail in Chapter 4. He specifically refers to the lack of proper training of the two main Israeli investigators Mariam Radiwker and Martin Kolar, their improper "suggestions" influencing the eyewitnesses to make the "proper" identifications, and the improper recording and reporting of the eyewitness testimony.

The blatantly suggestive nature of the photospreads used in the identification is best exemplified by what I shall refer to as Wagenaar's Experiment (W131-134). He chose 25 mock witnesses and presented them with the third album page of tav/57 with photographs 10 to 17 on it (as had been done with most of the witnesses interviewed by Radiwker and Kolar) with the following instructions: `We are looking for a man with a full round face, a short wide neck, a bald pate starting. We will give you a set of eight photographs; please point to the person who is most likely to be the wanted person.' All 25 mock witnesses pointed to picture No. 16 of John Demjanjuk [from 1951], without any exception.

Wagenaar then composed an alternate photographic lineup of eight round-faced, short-necked, balding males of the right age (including No. 16) and repeated the experiment with 25 mock witnesses at Leiden University. Only two of the mock witnesses pointed at Demjanjuk's picture.

The results of this chapter are summarized in Table 5.1: Of the 50 rules listed, 5 were O.K., the 4 to be applied by the court were ignored, 4 were not applicable, 28 were openly violated and of the remaining 9 rules the violation was implied by other violations.

Chapter 6: In the last chapter Wagenaar discusses the Ethical Aspects of Expert Testimony. He bases much of his discussion on the "Bayesian model of legal fact-finding", which "allows for a clear distinction between the task of the court and the task of expert witnesses". Although much of the argumentation in this chapter is difficult to follow, the gist of his message is clear in the following areas:

(a) Expert witnesses for both the prosecution and defense must be very careful not to usurp the role of the court by testifying outside their domain of expertise. Likelihoods based on statistical surveys, experimental studies, case histories, etc. as pertaining to the case at hand are the domain of the experts. It is up to the jury (or the judges, in the Demjanjuk case) to position the available evidence within this scientific framework to ascertain its reliability and relevance. [Although not specifically stated in the book, most of the expert witnesses for the prosecution can be fairly accused of violating these basic rules of ethics during their testimony in the John Demjanjuk trial.]

(b) Wagenaar totally demolishes McCloskey and Egeth's attack on the role of experimental psychologists as experts on questions of eyewitness reliability (tav/269). The work of McCloskey and Egeth is quoted very heavily in the Verdict to justify the judges decision to declare Wagenaar's testimony as "irrelevant because the surviving witnesses could not make mistakes".

(c) Similarly, in the 1981 Cleveland trial to denaturalize John Demjanjuk, the director of the OSI at the time, Allan A. Ryan, prepared a `Government's motion in limine to bar the testimony of defendant's expert psychologist and character witnesses'. (W163) The testimony had been prepared by psychologist Douglas Detterman, an expert on identification. Unfortunately, Judge Battisti, who presided at the Cleveland trial, "barred Detterman from testifying, and as a result there was no expert who commented on the procedures described in Chapter 4". (W165)

B. The Identification of John Demjanjuk

In order to give the reader as clear a picture as possible of the various steps in the identification procedures of John Demjanjuk as Ivan of Treblinka, these shall be listed in point form. In addition, we shall go beyond the information provided in Chapter 4 of Wagenaar's book and refer to prosecution (tav) and defense (nun) documents where applicable. INS refers to the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States and OSI refers to the Office of Special Investigations of the U.S. Department of Justice.

1) According to various newspaper accounts, in the fall of 1975 Michael Hanusiak, a communist supporter from New York, returned from the Soviet Union stating that he had been shown evidence that John Demjanjuk amongst others was guilty of war crimes. [To our knowledge, Mr. Hanusiak was never interrogated by the U.S. or Israeli authorities nor did he appear before any of the courts or judicial bodies investigating the John Demjanjuk case. Neither has his name appeared in any of the official court documents in the U.S. or Israel.]

2) At approximately the same time, a Soviet English-language publication, News from Ukraine, specifically targeted for the Ukrainian emigre community, presumably carried similar accusations concerning John Demjanjuk. [We have not been able to obtain a copy of this article, nor have we seen any references to it in official U.S. or Israeli documents concerning the case.] In this regard Wagenaar only states: "The name Demjanjuk was made public by the Soviets only in 1976" (W004).

3) On Feb. 20, 1976, the INS sent a "memorandum" to the Israeli police, Nazi Crimes Investigation Division, asking for Israeli aid to find witnesses against Demjanjuk and Fedorenko. A supplementary memorandum (tav/54, dated March 19, 1976 and received March 30, 1976) gave further information and instructions. In one of these memoranda a "letter of directives" (tav/55) gave specific details as to who should be interviewed (including Turowski, Goldfarb and Rosenberg), how the interview should be conducted and what questions should be asked. [It is interesting that of the 10 directives, the second one states that the witness be first shown the picture of the subject (along with at least three other people of the same age as the subject) and only in the third directive does it state that the witness should give a description of the subject.] Presumably, in one of these memoranda were 17 photographs of "Ukrainians living in the United States who were suspected of Nazi crimes" (tav/57 of which No. 16 is of John Demjanjuk from 1951). (See V0265 to V0306 for details as presented by the three judges.)

4) According to Wagenaar (W095), "In the second half of May 1976 three more pages were added to the album, but they were, as far as we know, not used in the investigation". (According to T02790, on May 29, 1976 Dov Freiberg was shown six cardboard sheets with 30 photographs.) Presumably, these pictures were incorporated into tav/25 which is an album of 43 pictures used for identification purposes and from which pictures for the Schlomo Helman interview were presumably chosen (V0325, T01866).

5) In April and May of 1976, Mrs. Radiwker published advertisements (tav/56) in the "foreign and Hebrew press" (V0270) stating: "The Nazi Crime Investigation Division is conducting an investigation against the Ukrainians Ivan Demjanjuk and Fedor Fedorenko. Survivors of the Death Camps at Sobibor and Treblinka are requested to report to the Israel Police Headquarters" (W096). [We have not been able to determine the names nor the dates of issue of the newspapers involved.]

6) Not included in Wagenaar's book is any reference to nun/141 which is a letter from the World Jewish Congress dated July 6, 1976 to the INS with a list of 20 survivors who failed to identify photograph No.16 (V0526, T11658, T11720). [It is not known on what date the INS illegally and irresponsibly supplied the WJC with photographs of Demjanjuk and others, but it is very apparent that such photographs were circulating freely throughout the Jewish communities perhaps even before copies were sent to the Israeli police.]

7) Mariam Radiwker's interviews May 9-11, 1976 of Turowski, Goldfarb and Rosenberg: Dr. Wagenaar does a masterful job in revealing all the contradictions in the statements of these three witnesses as recorded by Mrs. Radiwker and in her feeble, ineffectual attempts to explain away the contradictions during her court appearance. Rather than repeat Wagenaar's argumentations, we shall only highlight several interesting excerpts:

a) "Mrs. Radiwker wrote a statement of their testimony only at the end of the hearing, from her memory. The statement was written in the German language, and then read to the witnesses in Hebrew, after which the witnesses signed every page." (W096)

b) Goldfarb re Ivan: "I can say that in 1942/43 he had to be in Treblinka, but before the uprising in the summer of 1943, he was no longer, I believe, in Treblinka." (W101) And yet in two previous statements Goldfarb had stated that Ivan had been killed in the August 2, 1943 uprising. (nun/46, nun/51)

c) On May 10, 1976 Turowski stated (W101) "I know the name Demjanjuk", whereas the previous day he stated he only knew the name Fedorenko. In addition to Wagenaar's explanation that this is due to prompting by Mrs. Radiwker or to discussion with his friend Goldfarb (during the noon hour on May 9, 1976 or thereafter), it is possible that Turowski had seen Mrs. Radiwker's advertisement in the newspapers. He certainly did not hear it when he was allegedly an inmate of Treblinka.

d) Rosenberg had previously testified at least four times that he had personally participated in killing Ivan of Treblinka during the uprising August 2, 1943 (nun/7,8,9,10, nun/144). In addition to pointing out all the contradictions in his various testimonies and those of Mariam Radiwker and Martin Kolar regarding his various interviews, Dr. Wagenaar presents previously unnoticed testimony from the 1981 Cleveland trial about an earlier meeting with Mrs. Radiwker: "Now it appears that Rosenberg saw Mrs. Radiwker before the session on May 11, but there is no reference to this meeting in any official document." (W107). To our knowledge, no mention of this was made during Demjanjuk's Jerusalem trial!

8) Wagenaar then refers to several interviews during the summer, none of which were successful: Dov Freiberg (nun/26, 1976-05-29 or 30), Meir Zeiss (nun/28,1976-05-30), Simon Greenspan (nun/25, 1976-07-04 - which is particularly significant because Greenspan presumably worked in the stables and other witnesses testified that Ivan of Treblinka often went to the village for supplies in a horse-drawn buggy), Shalom Cohen (tav/44), Sophia Engleman.

9) Every year on the anniversary of the August 2, 1943 uprising in Treblinka, the survivors meet in Tel Aviv. Presumably, this also occurred in 1976 (W109) where the survivors undoubtedly discussed the case of John Demjanjuk.

10) Thereafter, Mariam Radiwker had more success with her interviews. Although Arye Kudlik (tav/64, 1976-08-15), Kalman Teigman (tav/65, 1976-08-17), Schlomo Helman (tav/67, 1976-09-28 or 29, who of all the witnesses interviewed should have been the most familiar with Ivan of Treblinka) failed to identify photograph No.16, three others did. These were Josef Czarny (tav/66, 1976-09-21), Gustav Boraks (tav/69, 1976-09-30), Abraham Lindwasser (tav/70, 1976-10-03 or 30). Some excerpts from Wagenaar's book regarding these witnesses is in order: a) Czarny: "If it was 16, it was Ivan." (W111, T01666)
b) "Another argument against Judge Levine's interpretation is that Czarny declared in the Fedorenko trial three times that he recognized only Fedorenko, no other person." (W112)
c) "The cavalier manner in which non-identifications were discarded as unimportant illustrates how little understanding the investigators had of the logic of identification tests, shoddy as it is." (W113)

11) Early in 1978 the INS sent a letter (tav/76, 1978-02-13) asking Israel to interview Sonia Levkowitch and Jakov Shmuelevitch (V0337). At this time "Mrs Radiwker transferred the case to her successor, Martin Kolar, in February 1978." (W115) Wagenaar does not refer to these interviews. Presumably, Levkowitch (tav/77, 1978-03-15 - who was allegedly in Treblinka from March to August, 1943 during exactly the period of time that the 3 judges claim Ivan of Treblinka had been transferred to Sobibor) made a positive identification of photograph No.16. Although she was listed as a witness for the prosecution, she did not appear at the Jerusalem trial.

Presumably, Shmuelevitch's interview was negative since there appears to be no record of it.

Kolar also obtained a positive identification of photograph No.16 from Pinchas Epstein (tav/78, 1978-03-29) who was a good friend of Eliyahu Rosenberg. To illustrate his suspicions as to the connivance between these two witnesses, Wagenaar quotes

a) Epstein: "With Eliyahu Rosenberg I meet on social occasions, weddings and similar pleasant occasions, and sometimes also at funerals and in private circles." (W115, T00916)

b) Kolar: "In the hotel they showed me pictures of weddings of their children, and I saw that at the wedding of Levkowitch, or rather of Rosenberg - Levkowitch was there, and Epstein was there too. At Epstein's weddings, the others were there too. And from this I determined that there is a warm friendship between them." (W120, T03137)

12) By 1979 the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), which was the off-spring of the 1978 Holtzmann Amendment, had taken over the Demjanjuk case from the INS. On Dec. 17, 1979 (tav/79, 1979-12-04) the Israelis received a new set of photographs from the OSI (tav/46 = Trawniki album = 8 photographs of which No.4 is the photograph of the controversial Trawniki document, tav/149, purporting to be John Demjanjuk's identity card from 1942) along with a request for Rosenberg, Epstein and Levkowitch to appear in Demjanjuk's forthcoming trial in Cleveland.

a) Although Kolar's interviews with Epstein (tav/80, 1979-12-25, 11:00 a.m.), Rosenberg (tav/81, 1979-12-25, 1:30 p.m.), and Sonia Levkowitch (tav/82, 1979-12-27) produced positive identifications of the Trawniki photograph, Wagenaar correctly points out the possibility of collusion amongst the three witnesses.

From our point of view, the witnesses should have attempted such identifications in a courtroom in Cleveland rather than being previously "prepared" in Israel.

b) The interview of Chil Meir Reichman from Uruguay (tav/185, 1980-03-12), carried out in a New York hotel room by OSI investigator Thomas Fusi (written Posey in the Appeal and Verdict), in the presence of Moscowitz and Parker, is strange to say the least. Fusi's report written seven years later on Feb. 13, 1987 states that Reichman was first shown the 1951 picture album, tav/57, from which he picked out photograph No.16, but could not identify the Trawniki photograph when shown the Trawniki album, tav/46. [However,, later at the Demjanjuk Cleveland trial in 1981, he did recognize the Trawniki picture.] Even more bizarre is that Fusi claims that the interview was conducted in English, whereas Reichman claims that an interpreter was used since he only speaks Yiddish and Spanish.

c) Finally Gustav Boraks made a positive identification of the Trawniki photograph (tav/83, Kolar, 1981-02-03). To quote Wagenaar: "This procedure is of course wholly unacceptable because the suggestion is created that Boraks was prepared for pointing at the correct pictures in the Cleveland court." (W123)

13) "In 1988 it became apparent that identification attempts had been made with at least 24 more witnesses. Fifteen of these witnesses had seen Ivan long enough to make a positive identification." (W123) Presumably this refers to the information released by the OSI as a result of a Freedom of Information Act suit by the Demjanjuk family and includes nun/153 to nun/174 in which none of the interviewees made positive identifications.

14) In addition to the above information, we note that:
a) Fedorenko did not identify John Demjanjuk as Ivan,
b) the German witnesses (Stangl, Franz, Otto Horn, etc.) made either negative or coached identifications,
c) the Demjanjuk family is pursuing further litigation against the OSI to release interviews with Richard Glazer and others who did not make positive identifications.

15) Conclusion to Chapter 4

From the above chronological list, it is perfectly clear that the identification procedures in the case of John Demjanjuk as used by the INS, OSI and Israeli police were woefully inadequate. No civilized court on this planet, claiming to follow accepted norms of jurisprudence, could attach any significant weight to the eyewitness testimony presented at the John Demjanjuk trial in Jerusalem. If the Supreme Court of Israel is concerned with justice, it will overturn the Lower Court's decision and exonerate John Demjanjuk completely.

Less clear are the motivations of the INS, OSI, Israeli Nazi Crime Investigation Division and other people involved in persecuting and prosecuting John Demjanjuk. Is it just a case of overzealousness for a "just cause"? Or are more sinister forces at work attempting to undermine the judicial systems of the United States and Israel?

It is difficult to ignore the suspicion that the whole "identification procedure" was an orchestrated conditioning process. First, a name is released and publicized worldwide as being a Nazi war criminal. The next step in the conditioning procedure is to circulate a more recent photograph (from 1951 and not from 1942) of the "Nazi War Criminal" throughout the Jewish communities of the world to "affix" the name and image into the brain of potential witnesses and the general public. [This is particularly relevant to Canada, since this is exactly the procedure used by Justice Jules Deschenes when the Deschenes Commission was showing immigration pictures of alleged suspects to potential witnesses in 1985 and 1986.] The first three witnesses, who just happen to have been chosen beforehand by the INS, just happen to make positive identifications from a blatantly unfair photograph parade and the perhaps not too subtle suggestions of the interrogator. After a lull of more than four months and plenty of opportunity for discussion amongst survivors, several more "volunteers" are found. Only after a sufficiently long period of such "fixation" is the relevant 1942 photograph shown the witnesses to "prepare" them for the Cleveland trial. And all the non-identifications are either ignored or the knowledge of their existence suppressed from the defense and the general public.

The end does not justify the means. The means is the end.

C. Excerpts and Comments Thereon

Although Wagenaar's work is overwhelmingly positive, there are several instances where the information presented is either inaccurate or incomplete. Once again, we shall treat these in point form.

1) An examination of the Transcripts, Verdict and Appeal, as well as news media reports, illustrates quite clearly that the guilt or innocence of John Demjanjuk was and remains a secondary issue to the people who have been persecuting him for these many years. To them the case has little to do with justice. The two main purposes of the persecution and trial of John Demjanjuk has been to promote the mythology that 850,000 Jews died in Treblinka and that Ukrainians are mainly responsible for this.

Nevertheless, social scientists, historians and journalists must be careful not to fall into the trap of distorting historical truth and promoting inaccuracies.

Statements to the effect that "Ivan the Terrible" had killed 850,000 people in the gas chambers of Treblinka appear six times throughout the book (pages ix, 1, 1, 46, 59, 148).

In the Verdict, the word Ukrainian appears 308 times, often unnecessarily and usually in lieu of the word guard. Such usage is even more numerous and more pronounced in the Transcripts. Although Dr. Wagenaar is often forced to utilize such terminology when referring to the trial documents and testimony of the expert witnesses and eyewitnesses, there are several instances where he unnecessarily utilizes such terminology himself. For example, this occurs three times in the first three pages of the Introduction. This detracts from his otherwise scientific analysis.

2) There are three instances where Dr. Wagenaar makes a serious error when referring to the Trawniki document:

a) "An identity card, made available by the government of the Soviet Union, revealed that an Ukrainian by the name of Ivan Demjanjuk was trained in the German camp Trawniki for service in concentration camps and death camps." (W002)

b) "The Trawniki document, if genuine, is an example of analytical proof that Demjanjuk was trained as a Nazi camp guard." (W071)

c) "This is the card that was released by the government of the Soviet Union, and which was used to prove that Demjanjuk was trained in Trawniki, the place where Ukrainians were prepared for service in concentration and death camps." (W117)

Most people who have examined the so-called Trawniki document will agree with Dr. Wagenaar that it is highly unlikely that it is genuine. Nevertheless, the contention that the Polish village of Trawniki was a training centre for service in concentration and death camps is patently false. The Germans had transformed all agricultural and industrial enterprises in Poland and other occupied territories to serve as an integral part of their war effort. They required guards to protect these enterprises from saboteurs and partisans. The Trawniki camp specifically recruited such guards from the local Polish populace and from prisoners of war who "volunteered" for guard duty to escape death from starvation which was the fate of the vast majority of prisoners captured on the Eastern Front. Only a small fraction of the personnel trained in Trawniki ended up being posted at concentration or death camps.

3) "Mrs. Radiwker was born in 1906. She was trained as a lawyer at the University of Krakow, and graduated in 1930. Subsequently she practised law in Poland and the Soviet Union, with an interruption during the war. In 1964 she emigrated to Israel,..." (W127)

Dr. Wagenaar fails to mention that she was born in a Ukrainian village called Latske (near Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine). Her parents fled to Vienna during WWI to escape the Russians but returned until 1923. From 1930 she served at the District Court in Pinsk (Byelorussia). On Nov. 7, 1939 after the partition of Poland according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, she crossed into the Russian-occupied zone and practised law in Tismanitsia (near Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine) until June 22, 1941 when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. She fled with her first husband to near Stalingrad, where her husband was first conscripted and later deported to and perished in Novosibirsk for having been in the Austrian and Polish armies. She returned to Tismanitsia in 1945, remarried Yifsay Radiwker in 1946 and practised law until 1957, when she emigrated with her husband and daughter to Poland. (T02677)

There is a particularly puzzling piece of testimony regarding INS use of the German language: "When it came to America, they did not give us any negative response, on the contrary they sent their instructions in German and in German as well as English." (T02778)

4) "Martin Kolar was born in 1920 in Czechoslovakia. He did not receive any legal training, but had some experience with investigating Nazi crimes in the years 1945-47. He came to Israel in 1965 and was hired by the Division for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes almost instantly." (W129)

Dr. Wagenaar fails to mention that during WWII "All of my (Kolar's) relatives from the closest to most distant were exterminated by the Nazis in the camps. I was in forced labour camps in Slovakia." (T03063) From 1945 to 1947 he worked in Division 7 of the Regional Ministry of the Interior of Slovakia, Bratislava in a special Department for the Investigation of War Crimes: "I would be sent as part of the Czechoslovakian military mission to the American-occupied zone of Germany in order to help in locating those war criminals ..." (T03050). In 1947-48 he was editor of a monthly publication Hashomair Hazair (a socialist Zionist youth organization) concerning Israel and the state of affairs in Palestine. During the Slansky Trials of Nov. 1952, he worked in a coal mine. From 1954 to March, 1965 he worked in the official government forestry services.

Mr. Kolar speaks a multitude of languages: Slovak, Czech, Hungarian, German, French, Russian, Serbian, Hebrew, English. In referring to the language used in investigations, he states: "I took it in German as was our wont in this Department for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes." (T03017) His intimate relationship with the INS-OSI and, in particular, Norman Moscowitz (who was the trial attorney in the Demjanjuk Cleveland Trial in 1981) is typified by the statement: "This is a letter of the unit after we reorganized the unit or rather the Justice Department of America, it's not the Immigration Office any more, but the Office of Special Investigations, which is directly addressed to me." (T03023)

5. As we have stated previously, Dr. Wagenaar has done an outstanding job in pointing out the multitude of irregularities in the eyewitness identification procedures associated with the John Demjanjuk trial. Thus, the last two sentences of the book are bewildering: "If the reader wants an answer to the question whether John Demjanjuk is Ivan, I can only refer to the court's verdict. It is the best answer we have."

Dr. Wagenaar is wrong! He should have referred the reader to the Appeal, Verdict and Transcripts of the trial. Anyone who studies these will become convinced that a grave injustice has been perpetrated upon John Demjanjuk by the INS-OSI of the United States, by the Division for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes of the Israeli police and especially by the three Lower Court judges Levine, Tal and Dorner.

1989-07-06

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Will Zuzak; DEMANUK.017 = 1989-07-06 Critique of Wagenaar book; 1995-04-04
*******************************************************************